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EQUITABLE SERVITUDES.1

performance of restrictions upon property before
SPECIFIC
Tulk v. Moxhay. Before the decision in Tulk v. Moxhay a
contract not to use land in a particular nianner was treated by
2

equity courts in the same way as were other negative contracts; if
the plaintiff was so injured ·in the enjoyment of his own land that
damages at law did not furnish an adequate remedy, equity would
specifically enforce the contract by granting an injunction against
the promisor.8 The right thus to control the use of the property
in the hands of the promiser can hardly be classified as other than
a property right,' but since it was enforcible only against the promiser it was a property right that could be easily destroyed by any
alienation of the property and therefore was of relatively small
value.
Tulk v. Moxhay. In Tulk v. Moxhay the plaintiff, who was the
owner of a piece of vacant ground in Leicester Square and also of
several of the houses forming the square, sold the vacant piece to
one Elms, the deed containing a covenant by Elms that he, his
heirs and assigns would keep the piece of ground in its then state,
uncovered with any buildings, etc. The piece of land passed by
several mesne conveyances into the hands of the defendant whose
purchase deed contained no similar covenant with his vendor, but
he had notice of the original covenant when he made his purchase.
The covenant did not run at law against the transferee of Elms because it was not connected with an easement; furthermore, there
was not only no common law property right but there was not even
a contract right against the defendant, because the defendant had
made no such covenant with any one. The defendant having manifested an intention to alter the character of the land and having
asserted a right to build thereon, the plaintiff sought and obtained
an injunction against his doing so. Such a right as equity declared
s The substance of this article will appear in a forthcoming book on Equity.
• (1848) 2 Phi!lipR 714- Altho Tulk v. Moxbay iR the leading ca.•e on the subject, the
point had already been decided in Whatman v. Gibson (1838) 9 Simon.q 106. It wa.< a;
sale of lots under a building scheme and the restrictions were mutual. The court did not:
say anything about unjust enrichment but merely pointed out the advantage to all the
proprietors of preserving the residential character of the neighborhood. The case of
Mann v. Stephens (1846) 15 Simons 377, also antedates Tulk v. Moxhay; it varies in facts
from Tulk v. Moxhay only in that the assignee entered into a similar covenant with the
original covenantor. The reasoning of the court is not reported.
•Martin v. Nutkin (1724) a P. Wms. 266 (promise not to ring a bell); De Wilton
v. Saxon (1801) 6 Ves. 106 (not to break up mowi02 land).
' For example, it would logically pass on the plaintifi's death to his heir rather than
to bis executor.
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belonged to the plaintiff as against the defendant in this case was
formerly called an equitable easement5 ; It is now more common
to call it a covenant running with the land in equity. Since such
restrictive agreements are recognized by equity as creating property
rights in chattels as· well as in land, while the common law recognizes no easements or covenants as giving property rights in chattels,
it avoids confusion and misapprehension to call them by the more
general term of equitable servitudes.
.
Argument of the court in Tulk v. Mo.xhay. The court in Tulk
v. Moxhay seemed to rest their decision on the ground that if such
a right were not recognized and enforced there would be unjust
enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff. Where the parties in
the different transactions after the purchase and covenant by Elms
supposed that the restriction was binding on transferees and fixed
the price of the property accordingly, unjust enrichment of the
defendant would result if the restriction were not enforced against
him. And where those same parties supposed that the restriction
was not binding on transferees and fixed the price according to that
understanding, urijust enrichment would result to the covenantor
if the restriction were enforced against the defendant. On the other
hand, where there is no misapprehension by the parties as to the
legal rule there is no unjust enrichment of any one beta.use the
price of the property will be fixed according to the enforcibility or
non-enforcibility of the restriction. Consequently the decisions enforcing equitable servitudes against transferees can be rested on
the doctrine of unjust enrichment only in the rather abnormal case
where the parties were mistaken as to the law. Oddly enough, it
has been the orthodox doctrine-now happily disappearing-that
equity would give no relief against a mistake of law.8 At the present day courts usually pay no attention to the question of unjust
enrichment in restrictive agreement cases.
A decision which shows that unjust enrichment is not the basis
of equitable servitudes is that of Rogers v. Hosegood. 1 In that case
•At common iaw there were five kinds of rights which one might have in the land of
anotber,-i. e., rights which could be enforced against the present or any future owner of
the land: (a) legal charges, (b) natural rights, such. as rights· adjacent and subjacent support, (c) easements, (d) profits, and (e) covenants running with the land. Equitable
servitudes on land are similar in some respects to common law easements, but there a;c
some points of difference which will be pointed out later in the article.
41 The usual reason given for denying relief was that everyone was presumed to know
the law-an unfortunate miAAtatcrnent of the rule that ignorance of the law does not
excuse one who has in some way incurred a prima facie legal liability; for example, by
committing a crime or tort or a breach of contract. The rule should not he applied to one
who has incurred no such liability but se~ AA plaintiff to be relieved from the conseouence$ of bi.q error.
T (1900) a Cb. 388.
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it was held that a tratisferee of the covenantor was entitled to enforce an equitable servitude on the defendant's property tho the
plaintiff knew nothing of the restriction when he bought his property from the covenantee.
Real basis of Tulk v. Mox hay. The court in Tulk v. M oxhay
reasoned in a circle. Whether there was unjust enrichment of the
defendant at the expense of the plaintiff depended upon the extent
of the plaintiff's right; i.e., upon whether the plaintiff could enforce
the restrictive agreement against only the coYenantor or whether
he could also enforce it against the transferees of the land. Tho
the reasoning in Tulk v. M oxhay is unsound the decision has been
followed with practically no adverse criticism and we must therefore find some other reason for it so that we may fit it in with
other parts of the legal system. This reason is found in the inadequacy of the commo~ law with reference to rights in another's
land,8 together with the almost total lack of governmental supervision of building in Anglo-American countries. Tho it might be
much better to have municipal control of the use of land than to enforce restrictions imposed by private individuals, such control by
private individuals has on the whole been beneficial in the last half
century's rapid growth of cities.
Who are bound by equitable servitudes? A common law easement or profit was enforcible against any successor in title tho he
paid value in good faith. 9 But like other equitable rights the benefit of an equitable servitude may not be enforced against a bona
fide purchaser.10 Tho a common law covenant running with the
•The common law rules< with reference to such risi:htio were auite risi:id. For example,
covenants runninsi: with the land bound only those who succeeded to the e.•tate of the
covenantor and could be created only where there was privity of estate; in this connection
privity of estate was said to exist where there was an easement of profit or where there
was the relation of grantor and grantee or that of lessor and lessee. Covenants running
with the land usually occurred in leases. The most common ones running with the land
against transferees were covenants to pay rent, to repair, to rebuild, not to use premises
in· a certain way, and not to assign the lease; those running with the land against the
lessor's transferees were covenants to rebuild and covenants to renew the lease. Iri
England covenants probably do not run against the transferee except in case of landlord
and tenant. Tiffany, Real Property, § 3#
9 Easements and profits are, however, generally required by modem registry acts in
this country to be recorded; hence, in the absence of such a record, a bona fide purchaser
will be protected. Armor v. Pye (1881) 25 Kan. 731; Taylor v. Millard (1890) u8

N.Y..24411 Independent of the recording acts. common law rights were enforcible against every·
one while equitable rights were not enforcible against bona fide purchasers. But wherever
the registry statutes apply there is. a new line of division; if the right, whether common
law or equitable, is recorded according to the statutory provisions, it is enforcible against
all; if it is not so recorded, it is not enforcible against bona fide purchasers or attaching
creditors. It has been generally held that the registry statutes allow and therefore require
the recording of equitable servitudes; where, therefore, they have been properly recorded
they are enforcible regardless of actual notice. See 18 Harv. Law Rev. 535.
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land was enforcible only against one who succeeded to the estate of
the covenantor, there is no such limitation upon the enforcement of
equitable servitudes. In Abergarw Brewery Co. v. Holmes"- there
was a covenant in a mortgage not to buy wines, beers, etc., from
.any one except the mortgagee; the restriction was enforced against
an under-lessee with notice,1 2 on the ground that it was the intention of the parties to bind every one claiming under the
mortgagor. In order to protect the defendant in such a case the
<lecree would of course be made conditional upon the mortgagee's
~omplying with his promise to furnish the liquor.
It has long been considered as settled that one who obtains title
from a trustee by adverse possession is entitled to hold it against
the cestui que trust even though he knew of the trust.13 On the
other hand, one who obtains title by adverse possession of property
subject to an equitable servitude does not thereby destroy the servitude even tho he had no notice of it.14 The only way in which he
~n get rid of the servitude is by getting a release or by violating
it and having the Statute of Limitations run in his favor.15 The
-reason for the distinction seems to be this: the holder of the equitable servitude is not interested in the ownership of the servient
property but merely in the way the property is used; hence his
rights have not been infringed till the property is used in a way
inconsistent with the servitude. Or, to state it differently, while it
-is a breach of trust for the trustee to convey the trust property to
.any one without the consent of the cestui que trust or an order of
court because he owes a fiduciary duty to protect and administer
the property for the cestui, the holder of property subject to an
-equitable servitude is not a fiduciary to that extent; he may alien
freely except that he must not destroy the servitude by conveying
to a bona fide purchaser for value.16 A fortiori, one who has disseised the owner of the servient property but has not yet acquired
title is bound by the servitude.17
l1 (r900) l Ch. 188.
"If he had not had notice, aliter; Carter v. Williams (r870) L. R. 9 Eq. 678.
n Wych v. East India Co. (1734) 3 P. Wms. 309.
1• In re Nisbet and Potts' Contract (1906) l Ch. 386. It is not clear whether the
-court did or did not regard notice as material. It should have been regarded as imma1erlal. See 18 Harv. Law Rev. 608.
10 In this respect the holder of the equitable servitude is treated just as if he had a
-common law easement or profit.
11 His position is similar to that of the owner of land subject to an equitable charge.
'The position of an unpaid vendor who has a right to specific performance is also
.11nalogous.
1 ' Mander v. Falcke (189r) .2 Ch. 554.
The court mentions the fact that he bad
notice; since he paid nothing for the land it would seem that be ought to be bound even
.if be had not had notice.
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Influence of Tulk v. Mo.xhay on promisot"s common law liability~
Indirectly the decision in Tulk v. M o.xhay has apparently affectecf
the promisor's copunon law liability. In order to make it clear that:
the parties intended that the· restriction should bind transferees it
is now usual for the promisor to promise not only for himself but·
also for "his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns". It seems
now to be assumed that this form of undertaking not only has the·
effect of making the restrictions enforceable in equity against trans- .
ferees but also of making the promisor himself liable at common.
law for any violation of the restriction by transferees.18 But a subsequent transferee with notice who does not bind himself by con-·
tract with reference to the servitude is liable at common law for in-·
fringements ·by his alienee OJJly if he authorizes such infringe-·
ments.19
Who may enforce equitable servitudes. In determining the question as to who may enforce equitable servitudes, ~quity will usually
carry out the intentions of the parties,-either express or implied
from all the circumstances of the case. While it is usually the intent to benefit not only the promisee as present owner of land in thevicinity, but also to benefit any future owner of such land, the parties.
may intend that the restriction be of less duration. In Renals v.
.Cowlishaw20 the devisees in trust for the sale of a mansion house·
and_ residential property known as the Mill Hill estate and of certain pieces of land adjoining thereto, sold and conveyed two of these
11 Hall v. Ewin (1887) 37 Ch. Div. 74, semble.
Even before Tulle v. Moxhay there
was nothing to prevent a promisor from undertaking to be liable for acts done by his:
transferee; but at any time it would seem that the promise should not be construed as'·
-including such an extensive undertaking in the absence of clear evidence of intent. Themere fact that he promises "for his executors and administrators" ought not to be conclusive because the phrase may have been used as a mere form; his e.""<ecutor or administrator, of course, would be responsible in any event for a breach committed by him while
he held the ·land. In Clark v. Devoe (1891) 124 N. Y. 120, a deed from the defendant of
a lot in New York City, after reciting that the grantee was the owner of an adjoininglot, contained a covenant on his part, "for himself, his heirs, executors, administratorsand assigns • • • that he will not erect or cause to be erected, on said lot, • • * any
building which shall be regarded as a nuisance, or which shall be occupied ·for any purpose
which inay render it a nuisance". The defendant conveyed the adjoining lot to X by a?
deed without any restriction; X erected a building which was used as a livery stable. In:
an action on the covenant for damages the court held that the covenant should not be so.
construed as to make the. defendant liable for the act of X, because of the "serious result
to the ·grantor with but slight benefit to the grantee". The dictum of the court that the
covenant did not create an eauitable "ervitude M as to bind tran•fereu i•. however. unsound: instead of reauirinit clear IanmaR:e to make the re.•triction enforcible bv injunction·
against transferees, it wauld and should tak,e clear language to limit the duration of the
restriction to the time that the covenantor io owner of the property, because of the comparatively small v:Uue of a rutriction thuo limited.
:it Hall v. Ewin (1887) 37 Ch. Div. 74• (1878) 9 Ch. D. 125. See ~o Badger v. Boardman (1860) 16.Gray 559,
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adjoining pieces of land to one Shaw, who covenanted, among
other things, that the property should be used for private dwellings
only and not for any trade or business. The conveyance did not
state that the covenant was for the protection of the residential
property or make any reference to the other adjoining pieces of
land. The same trustees also sold other pieces of land adjoining:
the Mill Hill estate, similar conveyances being made. The trustees
later sold and conveyed the Mill Hill estate to Bainbrigge who .died,
and his devisees in trust sold and conveyed to the plaintiff. The
pieces of land conveyed to Shaw came by several mesne conveyances into the hands of the defendants who carried on the trade of
wheelwrights, smiths, and bent timber manufacturers and had
erected a high chimney which emitted thick, black smoke, thus injuring the residential character of the neighborhood. The plaintiff
was refused an injunction on the ground that the restriction w:as
not meant to benefit the property, i. e., the subsequent owners, but
merely to benefit the covenantees "to enable them to make the most
of the property which they retained".
If the intent of the parties was that ·the restriction should exist
only as long as the covenantees should hold the land, the decision
seems unimpeachable. But it ought to be pointed out that to refuse
to protect the transferees in such a case very largely wipes out the
commercial value of the restriction to the covenantee unless the
trans£ eree erroneously supposed he would be protected; for if at
the time he contracted to buy he knew that he could not as purchaser
of the land enforce the restriction, he obviously would pay littler
if any, more than if there had been no restriction. The chief value
of the restriction, therefore, is merely to keep the premises free
till a sale could be made.21 On the other hand, if the intent was
clear to limit the duration of the restriction to the period of the
trustees' ownership of the Mill Hill estate and the purchasers of
the lots thus understood it and bargained accordingly they are entitled to be free from the restrictfon the moment the trustees convey
the property.22
The shift in the basis of equity jurisdiction against the promisor.
In the restrictive agreement cases before Tulk v. M o~hay the·
equity courts based their jurisdiction upon the threatened injury
to the promisee's enjoyment of his own land in the vicinity and
21 This might be of sentimental value to the occupants, and safeguard their own com·
fort during their occupancy•
.. If the restriction had been thu.• limited in duration. the lot purchasers might hav~
paid more than they would if the restriction was not so limited but whether they paid morct
or less has no be:iring on the enforcibility of the rei;triction.
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upon the inadequacy of the common law remedy to compensate for
such an injury; and in Tulk v. Moxhay, where the court assumed
without argument that they would have had jurisdiction to enjoin
the promisor, there was such threatened injury. Since Tulk v.
M oxha.y, however, there has been a change of attitude upon the
part of the courts that is ·none the less curious because probably
unconscious. In Peck v. Conwayza the master found as a fact that
the violation of the restriction "would be no appreciable damage
or injury to the plaintiff's premises". In discussing this, the court
said: "Such an act of the defendants w~uld be against the restriction by which they are bound, and a violation of the rights of
the plaintiff, of which she cannot be deprived, because in the judgment of others it is of little or no damage". In other words, the
court apparently regarded the plaintiff as being substantially in the
same position as if she had bargained for the fee instead of merely
for the power to control the use of the land. That is, if she had
contracted to buy tlie fee it would of course be no defense to a
suit for specific performance that the plaintiff would be as well
or better off without ~e land ; the fact that it is land is a sufficient
reason in itself. Similarly, having bargained for a restriction on the
land, she is now considered as having bought an interest in the
land and the fact that she would not otherwise be damaged if she
<lid not get specific performance is no longer considered important.
In other words, she is considered as being the equitable owner of
an interest in the servient land froni the moment the restriction is
intended to become operative.
·
May there be an equitable servitude in gross? If the covenantee
n~ed not show any threatened injury to his own premises in order
to get an injunction, but need only to show that he has bargained
for a restriction on the promisor's land, is it necessary that the
promisee should have any land in the vicinity which might be
benefitted? In Van Sant v. RostfM the plaintiffs had sold to the defendant Frank Rose a lot with a restriction against erecting a flat
or tenement building on tlie premises; the defendant Frank Rose
conveyed the premises to his wife, Alvida Rose, and both defendants
were proceeding to erect a flat building. In answer to a bill for
an injunction the defendants set up that the plaintiffs did not at
the time of filing their bill or for a long time prior thereto own
other property anywhere in the vicinity or neighborhood that would
be affected by a breach of the covenant. In giving the injunction
Mai:.._ 546.
"(1012) l:TD·DL Allll· 572. (l!lll) a6o

:II (1876) IIO

ill.

4DI.
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the court argued that the purchaser presumably paid a less price
because of the restriction and therefore the plaintiff ought to be
allowed to enforce it to prevent the defendants from being unjustly enriched; and that the plaintiff's motive in creating and attempting to enforce the restriction was of no importance. If this
reasoning2 5 were followed to its logical conclusion the plaintiffs
would have been able to enforce a restriction even tho they had
never owned any land in the vicinity except that which they sold
to the defendant Frank Rose, 26 indeed, even if the plaintiffs had
never owned any land whatever but had bargained with the defendant in some other way27 for the restriction. Whether the
equity courts will take these last two steps and recognize to the
full the doctrine of equitable servitudes in gross28 remains to be
seen. The decision in Van Sant v. Rose is a striking example of
the tendency of equity in the United States to become mechanical.
While one having an estate in possession in the dominant property can get an injunction without showing any damage to such
property29 it has been held that one who has an estate in remainder
or reversion after a life estate and is not the promisee must show
that the breach would cause injury to his estate in order to get an
injunction.30 This is analogous to common law protection of property rights; a person in possession may bring trespass for a viola21 While this reasoning is open to criticism the decision might conceivably be supported on the ground that the plaintiff in requiring the covenant and in suing for an
injunction intended to repre.•ent and did represent the property owners in the vicinity and
that the injunction wa.• Riven to protect them. No hint of thi• appears in the case.
'" In the suppose<t c;u;e ,._. in the actual ea.•e of Van Sant v. Ro.•e the purcha.•er probably paid a le."-• amount for the lot because of the restriction, hut just )low much is probably uncertain. Tf the iniunction were refused. would it be possible for the promisee to
force the defaulting promisor to make good this deduction in a suit in auasi contract?
It would l<eem that this ought to be allowed tho the Illinois Court of Appeals in Van
Sant v. Rose said: "There can be no adequate recovery at law". The uncertainty of the
amount ought not to be considered an in.ouperable obstacle to such relief. And if he can
get such relief, is not this an argument against allowing the injunction to one who
no longer ha.• any economic intere.•t in the neighborhood to be protected?
"' If the defendant hai; bargained for a cash payment, the plaintiff's right in auasi
contract seems clear.
:a May the same equitable servitude be treated as both appurtenant and in gross?
For CJC1mple, 1<uppo~e that in Van Sant v. Rose the plaintiffs at the time of the sale to
Frank Rose had other property in the vicinity which they intended to protect by the
restriction; later they sell this other property to X who does not wish to enforce the
restriction; may the plaintiffs do so? In such a case it might well be said that the plaintiffs should not be entitled because if the defendant should be enriched it would be at the
expense of X and not of the plaintiffs. But suppose that the promise was made expressly
for the benefit of the plaintiffs' other land and also for the benefit of the plaintiffs per·
sonally? If we follow the reasoning of Van Sant v. Rose it is difficult to see how the
plaintiffs could be denied an injunction •
., Dicken.•on v. Grand Junction Canal Co. (1852) IS Beav. 260.
ao Johnstone v. Hall (1856) :: K. & J. 414-

.g8
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tion of the possession and recover judgment without proving any
damage; the remainderman must bring an action on the case and
prove damage to his estate in the land in order to recover. If the
remainderman were also the promisee, he would not, of course, be
under- the necessity of showing any such damage if Van Sant v.
Rose should be followed.
Equitable servitudes attaching to after acquired property. In
Lewi,s v. Gollner31 one Gollner bought a lot in a residential section,
intending to erect a tenement building; the plaintiff, representing
-persons who owned residences in the neighborhood, sought to buy
him out and did buy him out, for the sole purpose of saving the
neighborhood from flats. The plaintiff paid Gollner $6,ooo more
than Gollner had agreed to give for the lot, the latter agreeing that
"he would not construct or erect any flats in plaintiff's immediate
neighborhood or trouble him any more". Immediately afterward
Gollner bought a lot diagonally opposite his first purchase and began erecting a seven-story flat. J;>laintiff's attorney threatened ac1ion and one of the materialmen refused to continue to supply him
further, so Gollner sold and conveyed the premises to his wife who
took with knowledge of all the facts and with the intention of
-protecting her husband. The plaintiff sought an injunction against
Collner and his wife; the lower court refused to give it but this
was reversed by the upper court. It is to be observed here that
.at the time the contract was entered into, the defendant Gollner
11ad no land to which an equitable servitude could attach and consequently there was, strictly speaking, no equitable servitude at
that time. The court seemed to think that the contract created
such a situation between the parties that an equitable servitude
.came into existence the moment that Gollner acquired a piece of
.land in the immediate neighborhood and would therefore be enforcible against a purchaser of the land with notice of the facts.
This is somewhat analogous to the creation of a trust of after ac.quired property.32 The actual facts of the case did not require
such reasoning; it was clear that Gollner's wife was colluding with
nim to help him· escape the consequences of his contract and even
-if the obligation of Gollner be considered as merely personal, damages at law being inadequate, the court properly enjoined the wife
as well as Gollner. But if Gollner transferred to a stranger who
"had no intent to aid Gollner to evade his contract but did know the
facts, such a transferee could be enjoined only on the ground sug_gested by the court.
"' (1891) 129 N. Y. 227.
as Pratt v. Tuttle ( 1884) 1.16 Mass. 233.
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Restrictive agreements as to a business. Tho the great bulk of
.equitable servitudes consist of restrictions placed on one piece
.of land, for the benefit of another piece of land,33 they may
be imposed for the benefit of a business and if so intended the
·benefit will pass to .the assignee of the business.34 Similarly, the
'benefit of a personal covenant not to compete with the promisee
·in business will- pass to the assignees of the promisee, if so intended.8~
On the other hand, the restriction may be enforced
.against the assignees of the covenantor's business. In Wilkes
v. S pooner36 X sold to the plaintiff his business of general butcher,
.covenanting not to establish a rival business within three miles.
X also conducted a pork business at a nearby shop which he held
.on lease. This lease X surrendered in order that his son, the defendant, who bought the pork business with notice of this covenant, might get a new lease and set up a business to compete
with the plaintiff's. The real reason for enjoining the defendant
·was that he was the assignee of the father's busines~not that he
11appened to occupy the same building; tho the court seemed to
put it on the latter ground, it is difficult to see how X, having only
.a term for years, could create an equitable servitude on the land
·which would outlast his lease.
The formality essential .to the creation of equitable servitudes.
Altho equitable servitudes are treated as technical property rights;
i. e., they are enforced tho the plaintiff would suffer no damage
to other land by a breach,-no particular formality is required for
their creation. Thus not only is a seal not necessary37 but there
is a conflict of authority as to whether any written memorandum
·at all is necessary to comply with the Statute of Frauds.38 Furthermore, it is not important whether the restrictions take the fonn
of covenants,39 reservations, or conditions.40
""This is a convenient figure of speech; legal rights and obligations may strictly be
predicated only of human beings.
"'Abergarw Brewery Co. v. Holmes (1900) l Ch. 188 •
.. Francisco v. Smith (1894) I43 N. Y .. 488. As the court pointed out, since the
benefit passed to the assignee of the business, no injunction can be granted if the business is discontinued; but a discontinuance does not put an end to the right but merely
suspends the enforcement, so that if the business is later resumed the covenantor can then
be enjoined. Clegg v. Hands (I890) 44 Ch. D. 503.
"'(I9Io) 24 L. T .. R. I57: fioII] 2 K. D. 473: 24 Harv. Law Rev. 574.
"'Dorr v. Harrahan (1860) IOI Ma«.•. 53I •
.. See Browne, Statute of Frauds (4th ed.) § 269; but see 5 Harv. Law Rev. 278:
"If the act.• and the land are <tated in writing. the court con<iderJ< the statute satisfied, and
will gather the other terms of the re.•triction by reading the writing as a whole in the
light of •urrounding circumstance.•."
a1 Peck v. Conway ( 1876) II9 l\fass. 546.
"Parker v. Nightingale (I863) 6 Allen 34I: 5 Harv.. Law Rev. 277..
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But altho form may not be essential it is as a practical matter
very important in drawing up instruments containing restrictions,
that express stipulations be made. If the covenantee wishes to
make certain that his transferees may take advantage of the restriction, the safest way is to have an express provision in the deed
that it is for the benefit of the land ; if he fails to do this, it will
then become a question of construction for the.court. In Tallmadge
\'.East River Bank41 it was held that if the sale was made with reference to a plat showing the restriction, that was enough. And in
Peck v. Conway 42 and Barrow v. Richard48 it was decided that if
on a fair construction of the whole instrument an intention to bene•
fit the land appeared, that was sufficient.44 If the seller intended to
sell all the property and not retain any himself, this fact tends
strongly to show that the restriction was meant to benefit the future
owners of the land.45
Whether equitable servitudes may require affirmative action.
With the exception of the spurious common law easement of fencing, common law easements require no action on the part of the
owner of the servient property.46 An equitable servitude, on the
other hand, may impose a duty to act tho the court may as a
practical matter refuse relief.47 If the act is of such a nature as to
require little or no supervision, enforcement will be decreed ; e. g.
in Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples/ 8 where the covenant was to pay
the grantor or his assignee one-fifth of flowage damages caused
by a reservoir dam. On the other hand, if the act is such as to
require a great deal of supervision, equity will usually refuse· reCl (I862) 26 N. Y.

In~.

a '1876) IIQ Mas.•. 546.
a (I840) 8 Paige 35I.
" s Harv. Law Rev. 278: "The ownership and character of buildings in the neighbor•
hood, plans, building schemes, the existence of similar restrictions upon other lots, even
parol agreements among neighbors, may be shown as bearing upon the probable intention
of the contractin2 parties."
"See the discussion of mutual covenants, post p. IOI. And see Nottingham Co. v.
Butler (I886} I6 Q. B. D. 778.
.. Tiffany, Real Property, § 3I2.
" Because of the difficulty of supervision and the interference with the personal
liberty of the defendant. It is a question to be decided as a matter of the balance of con·
venience. See s Harv. Law Rev. 278, 279.
"(I895) I64 Mass. 3I9. See also Atlanta, etc., Ry. Co. v. McKinney (I906) I24 Ga.
9 2 9, in which a covenant to convey water to the covenantee's residence was enforced
against the covenantoI'R ai;sip;neeR. In Cle11:11: v. HandR (I890) 44 Ch. ,D. 503, a covenant
by a !CRsee to buy beer only of the lessor was indirectly enforced in favor of the lessoI's
assip;nee.• bv enioininp; the lCR.•ee from buvinp; beer el~ewhere. It thus combines the
peculiar principles of both Tullc v. Moxhay and Lumley v. Wap;ner (I852) I De Gex,
:M. & G 604. See I4 Harv. Law Rev. 30I.
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lief as a matter of the balance of convenience unless the hardship
on the plaintiff would be very great if relief were denied.'9
Mutual covenants in general building schemes. Another illustration of the non-technical way in which equitable servitudes may
be created is shown in the rules applying to mutual covenants in
general buildipg schemes. In Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile
Co. v. Butler0 thirteen lots were put up at auction, subject to certain sale conditions as to the use of the land, which were also expressed in the deeds of conveyance to the various purchasers. It
was held that since the grantor intended to sell and did sell the
whole property, the restrictions were evidently meant to benefit
each lot as against all the others, and equity would effectuate this
intention. 51 In Barrow v. Richard52 it did not appear that the
vendor intended to sell all his property in the vicinity, but in each
of the conveyances which he made there was included a condition
against the property being used for "any other manufactory, trade,
or business whatsoever which should or might be in anywise offensive to the neighboring inhabitants". This was held to be sufficient to show an intention to benefit each of the lots soldn against
the others. The court in this case admitted that the plaintiff could
not recover _at law ;5 ' and it must be admitted that it would have
been difficult if not impossible to have worked out any principle at
common law which would allow the purchaser of the lot first sold
to enforce against a purchaser of another lot a covenant which was
not in existence at the time of the sale of the first lot. Equity,
however, is able to and does carry out the intention of the partiesn
41 Haywood v. Brun.•wick Building Society (1881) 8 Q. B. D. 403, covenant to keep in
repair not enforced against assignee•
.. (1886) 16 Q. B. D. 778.
01 The fact that the lots were not sold on the same day and the further fact that some
were sold at private sale were held to be unimportant since it was a general scheme. See
Collins v. Castle (188;.) 36 Ch. Div. 243.
u (1840) 8 Paige 351.
a As to whether other "neighboring inhabitants" not purchasers from the vendor,
might enjoin as expressly intended beneficiaries of the contract, Quaere•
.. This wM before the famous ca.•e of Lawrence v. Fox (1859) 20 N. Y. 268, which
gave a payment beneficiary of a contract a right to sue thereon; but it is at least doubtful
whether the present New York.law would regard the plaintiff as coming within the prin·
ciple of that case.
"' See 6 Harv. Law Rev. 290; 12 Col. Law Rev. 159. In Child v. Douglas (1854)
Kay 560 it is suggested that the later purchasers are assignees from the vendors of the
benefit of the covenants made by the earlier purchasers; but this does not explain the
obligation of the later purchasers to the earlier. In Parker v. Nightingale (1863) 6 Allen
34r it was held that since the vendor was only a dry trustee of the covenants for each of
the covenants for each of the purchasers he need not be joined. The purchasers would
seem to be beneficiaries of the contract rather than cestuis que trust, however. That mutual
covenants may exist without a sale but merely by agreement between two owners of neigh·
boring property, see Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch (1877) '/ON. Y. 440.
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by allowing the purchaser of any lot to enforce the restriction
against the purchaser of any other lot. 56 In such a building scheme,
however, each lot is treated as a unit; hence, if it is later divided,
one part of the lot can not enforce against the other p~rt ;51 but each
part _may enforce the restriction against any other lot or part thereof
or vice versa.
While it seems to be an unsettled question whether in the ordinary
case a covenant will bind after acquired property of the covenantor,58 it has recently been held in a general building scheme
case that after adquired property may be bound at least in the hands
of a transferee. In Schmidt v. Palisade Supply Co., 59 X, the owner
of land, projected a definite building scheme, including in his project
land to which he had no title. He later acquired this land and
conveyed a part of it to the defendant, subject to the restrictions
of the general plan. It was held that a purchaser of part of the
land originally owned could enforce the restriction against the defendant.60
Failure of purpose of restriction. Tho the plaintiff may get
an injunction without showing damage to his other property, he
may be refused preventive relief where it is not possible thereby
to secure to the plaintiff the ·benefit intended. In Jackson v. Stevenson,61 lots had been sold in I865 under a general building scheme
with restrictions against the use of the lots for trade or business
purposes. After I873 the character of that portion of the city
changed from a residential to a business district. In I89I the plaintiff sought an injunction but was refused because the court's decree
could not restore the residential character of the neighborhood, and
would therefore be practically futile.
The court, however, did not dismiss the bill but retained it for
the sake of assessing damages. This is to be justified only upon
•Tho equitable servitudes have grown out of the specific performance of contracts it
may be questioned whether it is at the present time necessary for the existence of equitable
servitudes, that there be any common law contract right against any one. For example,
if A has only ten lots and he sells them all at one auction according to a building scheme
it is at least doubtful whether there is any personal liability on any one. If there is not,
then the situation is analogous to a conveyance of land with a reservation of a common
law easement or of a rent charge.
IT King v. Dickeson (1889) 40 Ch. D. 596; Barney v. Everard (1900) 67 N. Y. Supp.
535. See 7 Col. Law Rev. 623.
13 See ante, p. 98.
"' (1912) 84 Atl. 807 (N. J.): 13 Col. Law Rev. 77.
11 It is an interesting question whether X himself would be bound by the general
restrictions as to the after acquired land. There seem to be no cases.
a (1892) 156 Mass. 496. Sec also McClure v. Lcaycraft (1905) 183 N. Y. 36, 19
Harv. Law Rev. 305. Also see Columbia College v. Thacher 87 N. Y. 3n where the
change had come about after suit was brought but before decree.
·
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-the ground that the servitude has not actually come to an end but
that it is merely unenforcible because of practical difficulties. The
court in McClure v. Leaycraft ,supra, seemed to proceed upon the
same theory i!l suggesting that the plaintiff could recover dam.ages at
law. It is difficult to understand this last suggestion because the
defendant was not the original covenantor but a purchaser from
him; but it is understandable to allow the plaintiff a sum of money
in equity as compensation for an equitable property right which
:the equity court in its discretion refuses to enforce. In Amerman v.
Deane62 the trial court having awarded $1,500 in lieu of an injunction the upper court ordered that the plaintiff should not get
the amotint unless she executed to the defendant a release of the
.servitude.
Public policy agai,nst enforcing restriction. A contract not to
compete with the promisee may be invalid at law and therefore not
·enforcible in equity because contrary to public policy in favor of
freedom of competition: For the same reason a court of equity
may refuse to enforce an equital?le servitude. In Norcross v.
James,63 one K conveyed to F .a quarry, retaining the surrounding
land. In the conveyance there was a covenant not to open .any
.quarry on the land retained. Plaintiff, a subsequent transferee of
the quarry, sought to have the covenant enforced against a s~bse
quent transferee of the sui:rounding land. Relief was refused on
the ground that it would tend to create a monopoly for the plaintiff. Whether, however, the restriction is against public policy
·ought to be determined on the facts of each case; there is nothing
in the report of the case to show that the restriction would injure the public,6 ' tho that might have been the fact; e. g. if the
stone were a peculiar sort which the public could not get on the
market. If, however, the stone were quite common and easily pro.cured by the public, there would seem to be no satisfactory reason
for refusing relief.6 G
Equitable servitudes upon and for the benefit of chattels. It may
be very important for the vendor or lessor of a chattel to impose
:restrictions upon the use of the chattel in the hands of the lessee
·and his assignees or upon the sale of it in the hands of the pura (1892) 132 N. Y. 355.
a (1885) 140 Mass. 188•

.. In Burdell v. Grandi (1907) 152 Cal 376, the owner of a large tract of land divided
it into lots and conveyed them to different purchasers by deeds containing covenants by
the vendors not to sell intoxicating liquors;- the purpose was to protect his own saloon
-from competition. The covenants were held void as creating a monopoly. See 21 Harv.
Law Rev. 450. See also Brewer v. :Marshall (1868) 19 N. J. Eq. 537 •
.. In the very similar case of Hodge v. Sloan (1887) 107 N. Y. 244 relief was given;
.the question of monopoly seems not to have been raised.
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chaser and his assignees. A few cases have enforced such restrictions, thus carrying out the intent of the parties. In Murphy v.
Christian Press Association Publishing Co. 66 the plaintiff bought
of the Catholic Publieation Society a set of electrotype plates, covenanting that it would not sell plates to any one else, and that it
would not sell books at less than a certain price. Later the Society
was dissolved and the receivers sold the plates to the defendant who
knew of the agreement. The defendant published and sold books
at a less price than the Society agreed to sell; the ·plaintiff was
granted an injunction. Here the covenantee was not the business
because the_ defendant did not buy out the business but merely the
plates and copyright, so that the dominant property here was the
plates sold and the servient property was the plates retained. It
is to be observed that the chattels involved here were protected by
the copyright law ; it is also held that the price of patented articles
may be similarly controlled.67 It was for a while contended68 that
the same rule should be applied to proprietary articles such as so. called patent medicines where there was a trade secret involved;
but the present tendency is in favor of holding restrictions in such
cases invalid.89 Where neither statutory nor natural monopoly is
involved the public interest in free trade in chattels should a
fortiori prevent the upholding of such restrictions.
Effect of plaintiff's default of acquiescence. Like other incor::poreal property rights, an equitable servitude may be released by
the owner of the dominant property and thereby extinguished ;70
whether the failure of the purpose of a restriction puts an end to
the right or merely to the plaintiff's equitable· remedy thereon has
already been discussed.71 A plaintiff may, of course, be estopped
by observing without objection the defendant's expenditure of
money in violating the restriction, tho it is at least doubtful whether
ee (1899) 38 N. Y. App. 426. See also N. Y. Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Co.
(1895) 83 Hun. 593; 20 Harv. Law Rev. 335.
"'See Park & Sons Co.
Hartman (1907) 153 Fed. 24 and cases cited.
"' See 17 Harv. Law Rev. 415.
"'Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. (19n) 220 U. S. 373; Price Restriction
on the Re-sale of Chattels, by William J. Shroeder, 25 Harv. Law Rev. 59-69. Mr.

v.

Shroeder's argument is that while the protection of the statutory monopoly of the patentee
and copyright owner extends to the chattels produced thereunder, the natural monopoly
of the possessor of a secret exists only so long as the secret is preserved and has no rela·
tion to the article manufactured by its use when once it is offered as a subject of com·
merce; that while the owner of the statutory monopoly gives the benefit of his discovery
to the public after a certain period, the owner of a trade secret gives nothing to the
public for his protection against fraudulent discovery or disclosure;
"Tiffany, Real Property, 1215·
n See ante, p. 102.
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this would bar the plaintiff from objecting to further violations.T 2
Where the restrictions are mutual a plaintiff may be barred because
he has himself violatetj. the restriction upon his own land ;Ta and
where a landlord imposed building restrictions upon several tenants
for their mutual benefit as well as his own and so failed to enforce
them against some of the tenants that the object of the restrictions
was defeated it was held that he had lost the power to enforce
against others.T 4 While mutual restrictions may come to an end by
mutual abandonment, a modification of the restrictions may be
made by all the parties without extinguishing the restrictions.Tis
GEORGE L. Cr.ARK.

University of Missouri Law School.
12

Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. (1858) II Gray 359.
Coates v. Cullingford (19n) 131 N. Y. Supp. 700; 12 Col. Law Rev. 158.
"Roper v. Williams (1822) Turn. & R. 18. See also Ocean City Ass'n v. Chalfant
(1903) 65 N. J. Eq. 156, restrictions against trade or business on Sunday; 17 Harv. Law
Rev. 138; 4 Col. Law Rev. 73.
ts See Sanford v. Keer (1912) So N. J. 240, where it was held that building a garage
on that portion of the lot intended for a dwelling house was not protected by a modification allowing necessary or desirable outbuildings.
12

